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With the signing of the Medicare Access and CHIP Reauthorization Act in April 2015, 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) is now positioned to drive 
the development and implementation of sweeping changes to how physicians and 
hospitals are paid for the provision of oncology-related services. These changes will 
have a long-lasting impact on the sub-specialty of gynecologic oncology, regardless of 
practice structure, physician employment and compensation model, or local insurance 
market. Recently, commercial payers have piloted various models of payment reform 
via  oncology-specific clinical pathways, oncology medical homes, episode payment 
arrangements, and accountable care organizations. Despite the positive results of some 
pilot programs, adoption remains limited. The goals are to eliminate unnecessary variation 
in cancer treatment, provide coordinated patient-centered care, while controlling costs. 
Yet, meaningful payment reform in oncology remains elusive. As the largest payer for 
oncology services in the United States, CMS has the leverage to make cancer services 
more value based. Thus far, the focus has been around pricing of physician-administered 
drugs with recent work in the area of the Oncology Medical Home. Gynecologic oncol-
ogy is a unique sub-specialty that blends surgical and medical oncology, with treatment 
that often involves radiation therapy. This forward-thinking, multidisciplinary model works 
to keep the patient at the center of the care continuum and emphasizes care coordi-
nation. Because of the breadth and depth of gynecologic oncology, this sub-specialty 
has both the potential to be disrupted by payment reform as well as potentially benefit 
from the aspects of reform that can align incentives appropriately to improve coordina-
tion. Although the precise future payment models are unknown at this time, focused 
engagement of gynecologic oncologists and the full care team is imperative to assure 
that the practice remains patient centered, embodies the highest quality in research 
and education, yet transforms into a sustainable and agile sub-specialty to pro-actively 
and effectively manage the immense and relentless financial pressures and regulatory 
expectations that will be faced over the next decade.
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iNTRODUCTiON
On April 16, 2015, President Barack Obama signed the Medicare Access and CHIP (Children’s 
Health Insurance Program) Reauthorization Act (MACRA). This new legislation repealed the inef-
fective and maligned sustainable growth rate (SGR) mechanism of updating fees to the physician 
fee schedule (1, 2). As the policies within MACRA are implemented, they will significantly impact 
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reimbursement and care delivery for oncology services. Many 
payment reform models piloted thus far have primarily focused 
on primary care and hospital-based episodes of care with recent 
pilots in medical oncology. These models vary in the extent to 
which physician services are aggregated across providers and the 
degree to which payments are distributed across different settings. 
Examples include the use of a modified pay-for-performance or 
a fee for the use of disease specific oncology pathways, bundled 
payments, oncology patient-centered medical homes (PCMHs), 
episode payment for services, and accountable care organiza-
tions (ACOs). The sub-specialty of gynecologic oncology is 
unique; physicians frequently function as both the surgeon as 
well as the medical oncologist. They often coordinate other 
modalities of therapy, such as radiation, and frequently remain 
the primary coordinator of their patients’ cancer care team 
throughout the trajectory of their disease. This includes those 
patients who transition to hospice. The nature of the training of 
gynecologic oncologists yields important efficiencies in terms 
of care coordination and potential reduction in unnecessary 
treatments or duplicative testing. Due to the breadth and depth 
of the subspecialty, physician payment reform will significantly 
impact the practice of gynecologic oncology. In this paper, we 
will first review some historic and current methods to achieve 
payment reform. Then we will review the preliminary details and 
implications of MACRA and discuss the possible profound and 
long-lasting effects on gynecologic oncology.
Historic and Current Components of 
Payment Reform
Currently, fee-for-service (FFS) is the most common reimburse-
ment methodology in oncology despite efforts to implement 
alternative approaches. This form of payment can inadvertently 
incent high-volume, high-cost procedural services. FFS often 
undervalues or fails to reimburse evidence-based, cost efficient, 
effective services such as patient education, prevention, care 
coordination, or end-of-life discussions. As an unintended conse-
quence, these perverse incentives can lead to fragmentation, inef-
ficiency, and waste. Payment reform in the FFS system previously 
has consisted of pay-for-performance (P4P) programs that have 
usually been a variation of FFS payments with a bonus element 
added for achieving certain quality milestones. Historic quality 
contracts have generally been a P4P model with limited success.
The care of women with gynecologic malignancies in the United 
States has greatly improved over the last several decades. A recent 
study demonstrated an improvement in relative survival for all 
stages of ovarian cancer from 1975 to 2011 (3). Possible reasons 
for this beneficial trend include the recognition of the importance 
of surgical staging and cytoreductive procedures; platinum and 
taxane-based therapy; intra-peritoneal chemotherapy; and the 
development of other effective chemotherapeutic and biologic 
agents. A population-level analysis from 1983 to 2009 showed an 
improvement in relative survival for women with stages I–III cervi-
cal cancer (4). A recent study demonstrated an improvement in 
overall survival in patients with recurrent, persistent, or metastatic 
cervical cancer with the addition of bevacizumab to combina-
tion chemotherapy (5). There was no significant deterioration in 
health-related quality of life in patients receiving anti-angiogenic 
therapy (6). Such advancements in cancer survival and maintenance 
of quality of life are predicated on scientific research. Efforts in both 
academia and industry have yielded progress in the understanding 
of the mechanisms of cancer prevention and treatment, paving the 
way to novel therapies that translate into improved outcomes. Due 
in part to the success in cancer therapy, increasing demand, and 
the demographics of an aging population, cancer care will remain 
a major driver of escalating healthcare spending in the United 
States. In the United States, approximately 1.6 million people are 
diagnosed with cancer annually. A 2011 study projected total 
cancer spending to be approximately $157 billion in 2020 – a 27% 
increase from 2010 (7). “The distribution of total cancer care costs 
is 32% for chemotherapy drugs, administration, and radiation; 
33% for inpatient and physician surgical claims; and 12% for other 
physician services. The remaining 22% is composed of evaluation 
and management, hospice, laboratory tests, imaging services, and 
inpatient stays without surgery” (8). Due to the broad range of ser-
vices provided by many gynecologic oncologists, the sub-specialty 
contributes to numerous different categories contributing to the 
total cost of cancer care. Therefore, the impact of payment reform 
on gynecologic oncology could be significant.
Sustainable Growth Rate
The SGR was a method previously used by the Centers for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) that was designed to 
control spending on physician services. Enacted by the Balanced 
Budget Act of 1997, the SGR was designed to ensure that the 
annual increase in the expense per Medicare beneficiary did 
not exceed the growth in the Gross Domestic Product. The SGR 
formula was responsible for determining the annual increases or 
decreases to the Medicare physician fee schedule. Under the SGR 
mechanism, if the growth in the volume of services exceeded the 
target growth rate, the yearly update to fees was to be reduced 
with a “conversion factor” to bring spending in line with the 
target. The short-term fixes imposed administrative burdens on 
CMS and clinicians and they created uncertainty for health care 
professionals and beneficiaries about uninterrupted access to care 
(9). The resulting instability and uncertainty led to 17 overrides 
of scheduled fee cuts. The repeal of the SGR now means that the 
temporary measures to override the growth rate formula will no 
longer dominate Medicare policy discussions, as they have for 
the last decade. The replacement of the SGR should also acceler-
ate the movement away from unconstrained FFS payments and 
toward continued payment reforms.
Physician Quality Reporting System
The Physician Quality Reporting System (PQRS) is a voluntary 
quality reporting program established by CMS in 2007, which 
follows a P4P model – namely that physicians are paid a fraction 
of their FFS payments initially as a positive bonus on their overall 
reimbursable claims. The program was designed to encourage both 
individual providers as well as group practices to report quality of 
care data to Medicare (10). PQRS provides the opportunity to assess 
the quality of care provided by a physician or practice and quantify 
their performance on a particular metric. Beginning in 2015, if an 
eligible professional or group practice did not satisfactorily report 
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PQRS measures in 2013, they would receive a 1.5% payment 
penalty on their 2015 Medicare reimbursements. Providers and 
practices who report in a compliant manner for the 2015 program 
year will not receive the 2017 PQRS negative payment adjustment. 
The Society of Gynecologic Oncology (SGO) has published PQRS 
measures relevant to gynecologic oncology (11).
Electronic Health Records Incentive Programs 
(“Meaningful Use”)
The electronic health record (EHR) incentive program was 
established as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009 (ARRA). ARRA amended the Social Security Act 
by creating incentive payments to providers and hospitals “to 
promote the adoption and meaningful use (MU) of interoper-
able health information technology (HIT) and qualified EHRs. 
These incentive payments are part of a broader effort under the 
HITECH (Health Information Technology for Economic and 
Clinical Health) Act to accelerate the adoption of HIT and utiliza-
tion of qualified EHRs” (12). “MU” has three stages that began in 
2011. The objective of Stage 1 (2011–2012) was to promote basic 
EHR adoption, data capture, and sharing. For Stage 2 (2014), the 
objectives were to advance clinical processes and emphasize care 
coordination and the exchange of patient information. Stage 3 is 
expected to be implemented in 2016 with a goal to show that the 
quality of health care has been improved.
Physician Value-Based Payment Modifier
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) directs the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services (HHS) to develop and implement a budget-
neutral process to financially reward physicians who provide 
health care that is high in quality and low in cost (13). This system, 
the physician value-based payment modifier (PVBM), will adjust 
the fee schedule payments based on the quality and cost of care 
delivered to Medicare beneficiaries. “The PVBM reward formula 
is a system in which performance is assessed in two dimen-
sions (quality and cost), with payments accruing to physicians 
who have above-average performance along both dimensions. 
Physicians who perform worse than average or choose not to be 
involved will be paid less, while those with average performance 
will experience no change” (14). The maximum bonus is ~2% of 
Medicare fees and the maximum penalty is ~1%, based on the 
2013 program year (13). Thus, the model is similar to a P4P-
type program with the majority of payments in a traditional FFS 
setting and a smaller bonus or penalty based on performance. 
When defining PVBM, “CMS will use the PQRS quality meas-
ures reported by individual physicians and by groups under 
that program’s reporting mechanism of which there are several 
options. Total per capita costs for Medicare beneficiaries will 
be used to calculate a cost composite score for the value-based 
payment modifier” (14).
MeDiCARe ACCeSS AND CHiP 
ReAUTHORiZATiON ACT OF 2015 eRA
When Congress passed the MACRA, it gave HHS the authority to 
move ahead with alternative payment models (APMs). MACRA 
introduced comprehensive changes to how Medicare pays physi-
cians and hospitals for among many areas, oncology-related ser-
vices. MACRA makes three important changes to how Medicare 
pays healthcare providers who care for Medicare beneficiaries. 
First, the new law repeals the SGR formula as a mechanism 
for determining Medicare payments for physicians’ services 
and puts into place a predictable annual increase through 2019 
before a complete transition to the new system described below. 
Second, MACRA establishes two payment options beginning in 
2019, which create a new framework for rewarding providers for 
giving better care and not simply more care. One option is the 
merit-based incentive payment system (MIPS) that consolidates 
current programs and retains many elements of the current FFS 
structure with a new system for positive or negative adjustments 
to the fee schedule payments. Critics have argued that in many 
ways, it is largely a P4P-type model and many physicians who are 
either confused or intimidated by APMs will chose MIPS and 
potentially tolerate penalties and flat/negative payment adjust-
ments in medicare. The second option, participation in an APM, 
is different from the current FFS system. Both choices move 
toward a valued-based system, with an overarching emphasis on 
quality, not volume, of healthcare services provided. Regardless 
of the pathway within MACRA, the new reimbursement system 
will likely require transformative changes to the structure of a 
medical practice. Both paths require practices to (1) report 
quality metrics, (2) demonstrate MU of EHRs and use resources 
responsibly, and/or (3) take on financial risk. Third, MACRA 
incentivizes practice transformation by combining the existing 
quality reporting programs into one new system. While many 
have hailed the repeal of the SGR mechanism, the passage of 
MACRA now raises new questions about where the United States 
health care system is headed in the post-SGR world of payment 
and delivery reform.
Merit-Based incentive Payment System
The MIPS is a new payment system that consolidates existing 
P4P programs and accounts for quality, resource use, EHR 
utilization, and clinical practice improvement. MIPS combines 
parts of the PQRS, the PVBM, and the MU program – and adds 
a new category of clinical practice improvement activities – into 
a single program that will assess physicians on these categories. 
The MIPS Composite Score will include components for quality 
(approx. 30% based on PQRS by 2021), MU (initially 25%, then 
reduced to 15%), resource use (30% based on PVBM by 2021), 
and clinical practice improvement (25%). Clinical practice 
improvement activities are those that contribute to advancing 
care coordination, safety, and care. Examples include expanding 
access, care coordination, safety, and participation in registries. 
Although details on MIPS will be the subject of policymaking 
for several years, it is important to understand that some of the 
assessments made at the effective date of 2019 will be based 
upon 2017 data. For the 2015 and 2016 performance years, 
the PQRS, PVBM, and MU programs will continue as separate 
payment adjustment programs. MACRA provides physicians 
and other health care professionals with stable fee updates for 
5 years (an update of 0.5% for the last 6 months of 2015 and an 
increase of 0.5% per year for 2016 through 2019). For 2015 to 
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2018, the current payment system remains unchanged. Under 
MIPS, the payment rates in 2019 will be maintained through 
2025 but with positive and negative adjustments based on the 
composite performance score of each eligible physician or other 
health professional on a 0- to 100-point scale. The scores will 
be publicly reported on the CMS Physician – Compare website. 
The composite score will be reported for all providers, compared 
to peers, and will be available to consumers. The adjustments, 
however, are designed to be budget neutral so that there would 
be no effect on overall payments beyond an additional $500 
million that would be made available each year from 2019 to 
2024 to reward excellent performance (15). The MIPS payment 
adjustments can be significant (±9% adjustments) with top 
performers earning +27%.
Alternative Payment Models
The leadership at the Department of HHS aims “to have 30% of 
Medicare payments tied to quality or value through alternative 
payment models by the end of 2016 and 50% of payments by 
2018” (16). Under the new legislation, clinicians who receive a 
substantial portion of their revenues from approved APMs will 
not be subject to MIPS. Instead, they will receive a 5% bonus 
each year from 2019 to 2024. To qualify, the APM must comprise 
25% of provider revenue or patients between 2019 and 2020. 
By 2023, this increases to 75% of provider revenue or patients. 
In 2026, the payment rules for all clinicians change again, with 
payment rates under the APM increasing by 0.75% per year and 
rates for others increasing by 0.25% per year. MACRA incentiv-
izes participation in APMs by establishing a system in which, 
beginning in 2019, qualifying healthcare providers may receive 
a lump sum for participation in a certified APM at a certain 
level. That incentive payment will be equal to 5% of the prior 
year’s estimated aggregated expenditures under the fee schedule. 
Beginning in 2026, when the lump sum payment goes away, the 
baseline fee schedule payments will still be higher for qualifying 
APM participants than for other providers in the MIPS system. 
APMs must involve a downside risk and quality measurement. 
While, currently, there are not many APMs for oncology, the 
legislation encourages development and recognition of models 
available to medical specialists, such as oncologists. How an APM 
will be recognized for purposes of the program is still evolving, 
but may include existing models, such as ACOs, PCMHs, and 
bundled payment models. MACRA also introduces a new path-
way to qualify APMs, called physician-focused payment models 
(PFPMs). While CMS will determine which PFPMs qualify as an 
APM under MACRA, the law mandates that qualifying PFPMs 
require the reporting of quality measures, the use of certified 
EHRs, and that the physician has “more than nominal financial 
risk” (with the exception of a PCMH, for which the risk require-
ment is waived). Stakeholders can submit proposals. A newly 
established Technical Advisory Committee will assess PFPM 
proposals from stakeholders and make recommendations to 
the HHS Secretary about which models to adopt as a qualifying 
APM and the Secretary will consider and release a list of available 
APMs. The Secretary must release criteria for a qualifying APM 
by November 1, 2016.
Approaches to the Design of  
Oncology-Focused APMs
Potential designs for APMs may be viewed along a continuum 
through greater bundling across either providers or payments. 
“APMs transition from volume- to case-based payments, reduce 
or limit the FFS component, and use performance measures 
to hold providers accountable. Providers gain flexibility by 
decoupling provider payments from the volume and intensity 
of specific services, but they also face greater accountability for 
lowering costs, and depending on the performance measures that 
affect payment, for better quality care and better results” (8). The 
ability of an APM to improve outcomes also depends on invest-
ments and support, such as the timely collection and analysis of 
validated data, systematic processes for data-driven learning, and 
deployment of user-friendly HIT systems. The success of more 
transformative APMs – including oncology PCMHs and oncology 
ACOs – will require greater investments in human resources, work 
flow changes, provider engagement, and other aspects of practice 
change, such as strategies to increase scale and deployment of 
sophisticated cost accounting tools. Successful implementation of 
a PCMH or an ACO will also impose a heavier administrative bur-
den compared to clinical pathways or bundled payment models.
The specific type of APM implemented will also depend on 
the physician employment structure. The spectrum of an oncol-
ogy provider’s employment model spans from single-specialty 
private practice, multi-specialty independent group practice, to 
hospital-based employment in a comprehensive cancer center or 
large regional multi-hospital system. In each scenario, there will 
be variation in the extent of physician alignment and the ability 
to bundle professional and technical charges. Although smaller 
practices may be more agile to respond to change, large-scale 
operations can reduce costs via efficiency, controls, standardiza-
tion, and supply chain management. A large-scale health care sys-
tem, offering a broad range of services across the care continuum, 
may also be more adept at retaining a patient throughout their 
oncology journey. In addition to medical, surgical, and radiation 
oncology-related services, this could include emergency room 
visits, home health, palliative care, and other medical specialty 
services across a large geographic area. Therefore, factors, such as 
physician integration, scope of services offered, and the scale of 
the health care enterprise, will significantly impact the decision of 
which APM is most appropriate in any local market.
A recent paper provides an outline of four different 
APMs – clinical pathways, oncology PCMHs, bundled payments, 
and oncology ACOs – to show a continuum of payment incentives 
that can influence the extent to which care delivery changes limit 
or reduce costs (8). These APMs were selected “because they can 
support incremental to comprehensive clinical transformations, 
thereby accounting for the breadth and size of oncology practices, 
populations served, and payer types.” These reforms, summarized 
in Table 1, can be viewed as building blocks along the spectrum 
of payment reforms.
Clinical Pathways
Oncology-specific clinical pathways are standardized, evidence-
based, dynamic, cost-effective protocols for the treatment of 
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cancer patients. Although development, implementation, and 
assessment of compliance are challenges, pathways require 
comparatively limited structural changes to a practice or pro-
vider risk (30). This model is designed to encourage providers 
to adhere to disease-specific oncology pathways while reaching 
or exceeding quality benchmarks. An additional case manage-
ment fee may be necessary to off-set the administrative burden of 
assessing pathway compliance and pathway maintenance. Early 
results show that pathway programs can decrease cost growth 
through diminished use of aggressive treatments that are not 
supported by clinical guidelines (31). Two papers demonstrate 
that pathways can reduce variation in chemotherapy use, while 
maintaining overall survival rates (32, 33). Reducing unnecessary 
clinical variation and providing more predictable costs is another 
goal of these reforms. Pathways alone, however, may not have 
a significant impact on care coordination or other aspects of 
personalized care. For some oncologists, pathways may represent 
an initial foray into practice standardization and assessment of 
compliance with evidence-based practice. Depending on the 
extent of physician integration and practice structure, proactive 
change management and a realistic assessment of local culture 
will be imperative to set the pace for pathway implementation 
and ultimately impact the likelihood of sustainable compliance.
Oncology Patient-Centered Medical Home
“The oncology PCMH is a practice-level approach that promotes 
care coordination and improvement through payments that 
are more extensively aligned with practice features expected to 
improve patient outcomes and patient-level performance meas-
ures” (8). Providers can use a per beneficiary per month fee in 
an oncology PCMH to support services that have traditionally 
not been reimbursed (i.e., access through expanded office hours, 
team-based care models, and advanced HIT) to encourage better 
patient education and care coordination and management (34). 
A successful implementation of an oncology PCMH would likely 
require an engaged and well-integrated group of oncology teams 
spanning a variety of sub-specialties beyond oncology. Improved 
care coordination combined with robust support for cost- effective 
services in the oncology PCMH model potentially reduces hos-
pitalizations and emergency department (ED) visits, prevents 
overutilization of unnecessary high-cost drugs and services, and 
improves symptom management beyond the hospital setting (34, 
35). Preliminary results from one oncology PCMH showed reduc-
tions in ED visits (68%), hospital admissions per patient treated 
with chemotherapy (51%), length of stay for admitted patients 
(21%), overall outpatient visits (22%), and outpatient visits in the 
chemotherapy population (12%) (34, 36). Although the increased 
administrative burden may erode margins, successful oncology 
PCMH models have reported significant net cost reductions via 
reduced ED visits and hospitalizations. One oncology PCMH 
reported aggregated savings of approximately $1 million per 
physician per year (37). Another program also saw substantial 
cost reductions from lower utilization of hospital admissions 
(34%), hospital days (44%), and ED visits (48%) (35). However, 
these savings have not been reproduced in all cases. The physician 
compensation model, practice structure, healthcare market, and 
local payer strategy may influence the level of adoption of an 
oncology PCMH. More evidence is required relevant to oncology 
PCMHs to determine specific factors of the payment and delivery 
reforms that may improve the likelihood of success.
Bundled Payment
A more comprehensive bundled payment methodology is pos-
sible, either within or outside an oncology PCMH. Providers are 
generally compensated with a one-time payment for a specific 
set of cancer services over a pre-determined treatment period or 
episode of care (32). “To the extent a broader range of services 
are bundled, providers can gain even more flexibility to redirect 
resources to cost-effective patient-centered activities that FFS 
does not reimburse” (8). The provider subsequently incurs greater 
accountability and more pressure to reduce the cost of care 
(38, 39). Recent results from one bundled payment pilot show a 
34% reduction in total cost of care (40).
The extent of coverage of a bundled payment in oncology 
can vary based on how the bundle is designed. A bundle could 
be based on a timeframe; or within a pre-specified boundary 
on a pathway; or include technical and/or professional charges. 
Many other factors will need to be pre-determined. For exam-
ple, how are costs allocated when care is delivered outside the 
scope of the agreement or in non-contracted facilities and 
labs? Most early pilots are limited bundles that included the 
administration of chemotherapy and supportive-care drugs 
(32, 39, 41, 42). More comprehensive bundles may include 
the drug acquisition costs, imaging and lab services, surgery, 
or radiation therapy. Bundled payments must be linked to 
performance benchmarks. To date, there are few prospective 
total cost bundles; there is a ground-breaking pilot program 
in head and neck cancer that bundles the total cost of care 
for 1 year in a prospective payment (24). The increased prob-
ability for cost variation per patient that accompanies more 
comprehensive bundles would imply that providers face more 
uncertainty about their net revenues. This likely explains why 
more comprehensive bundles have not been widely adopted 
to date. Another barrier to adoption is the challenge of cost 
accounting in a complex health care system. Factors such as 
physician integration and the ability of a hospital to fully cost 
expenses (i.e., labor, overhead, pharmacy, supplies, etc.) may 
vary widely. Therefore, there will likely be significant variation 
in the level readiness of oncologists and hospitals to move 
forward with bundled payments. At least initially, there may 
be significant variation in the scope and cost of a bundle based 
on local and regional factors. In the future, as more meaningful 
quality metrics become publically available, bundle payments 
may drive consumerism and competition.
Oncology-Specific Accountable Care 
Organization
The oncology ACO model partially links reimbursement to 
overall costs and quality of care for patients with cancer. In 
comparison, a “shared savings” oncology ACO would provide 
an incentive beyond the usual FFS payments, based on whether 
total spending for the relevant patients is below a benchmark and 
whether quality measures meet the pre-determined threshold. 
In an ACO environment, providers are accountable for the cost, 
TABLe 1 | Comparison of oncology payment models by delivery, physician employment, and payment structure, and quality measurement.
Payment 
model
Clinical  
pathways
Oncology  
PCMH
Bundled payment Oncology-
specific ACO
Global 
payment
Delivery 
structure
Use of evidence-based 
pathways or guidelines
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Care coordination focus No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Requires major practice 
transformation
No Yes No (for the types of bundles 
currently in market)
Yes Yes
Probability of 
implementation 
based on 
physician 
employment 
structure
Single-specialty group, private 
practice
Medium Low Low Low Low
Multi-specialty group, private 
practice
Medium Medium Low Low Low
Hospital employed, single 
general hospital
High Medium Medium Low Medium
Hospital employed, 
comprehensive cancer center
High High Medium Medium Medium
Hospital employed, multi-
hospital system
High High High High High
Payment 
structure
Case-based payment 
component
Revenue neutral 
supplemental 
payment for pathways 
adherence
PMPM management fee Episode-based prospective  
or retrospective payment for  
pre-determined defined 
bundle of service
Partial capitation Total 
capitation
Transition from P4P to  
value-driven care
P4P P4P Value driven Value driven Value  
driven
Potential for global or 
capitated payment
No No Partially based on boundary 
of bundle (i.e., inpatient, 
imaging, ancillary service, etc.)
Yes Yes
Payment majority linked 
to quality and financial 
performance outcomes
No No Yes Yes Yes
Quality 
measurement
Incentives for continuous 
quality improvement activities
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Pilot 
programs
Alabama Health 
Improvement Initiative, 
Oncology Clinical 
Pathways Pilot (17) 
and The WellPoint 
Cancer Care Quality 
Program (18)
New Mexico Cancer Center 
(19) and Wilshire Oncology 
Medical Group (20), Cancer 
& Hematology Centers of 
Western Michigan (21), 
Consultants in Medical 
Oncology and Hematology 
(22), and COME HOME, Moffitt 
Cancer Center and Aetna 
Oncology Medical Home 
Collaboration (23)
MD Anderson and 
UnitedHealthcare pilot in 
Head & Neck Cancer (24), 
Mobile Surgery International 
and BCBS of Florida (25), and 
Humana and 21st Century 
Oncology (26)
Florida Blue and 
Moffitt Cancer 
Center (27) and 
Baptist Health 
South Florida, 
Florida Blue and 
Advance Medical 
Specialities (28)
All-Payer 
Innovation 
Model in 
State of 
Maryland 
(29)
Adapted from KP’s original work (8).
Patient-centered medical home (PCMH), accountable care organization (ACO), pay for performance (P4P), per member per month (PMPM).
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quality, and overall care for a population in exchange for the 
opportunity to share savings with the payer. Therefore, the ACO 
construct encourages proactive management to deliver efficient, 
coordinated, and cost-effective cancer care. The increased 
accountability places critical importance on the administrative 
component of the ACO to manage and coordinate care thought-
fully. For this reason, some practices will require a significant 
transformation of practice and additional resources to participate 
as an oncology ACO.
Given the increasingly personalized, costly, and highly 
variable nature of oncology care, traditional ACOs have taken 
a measured approach toward oncology-specific reforms. Despite 
these challenges, there are several pilots of oncology-specific 
ACO arrangements and oncology-focused arrangements within 
population wide ACOs. These models link payment to perfor-
mance metrics (Table  1). “Such oncology ACOs may also be 
partially or fully capitated, with some or all of the FFS payments 
related to oncology shifted into a fixed, risk-adjusted payment per 
patient that is contingent on meeting performance benchmarks. 
The extent to which an oncology ACO model resembles a global 
payment depends on the size and scope of the shift from FFS to 
a fully bundled capitation payment and whether other specialties 
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bundle in the treatment of head and neck cancers (24). This pilot 
program prospectively covers the total cost of care for head and 
neck cancer for 1 year. The sub-specialty of gynecologic oncol-
ogy is unique, in that many gynecologic oncologists practice 
both surgical and medical oncology. In addition, the diseases 
managed by gynecologic oncologists frequently use radiation 
therapy, either in the primary, adjuvant, or palliative settings. 
For these reasons, the sub-specialty of gynecologic oncology is 
especially exposed to the unprecedented and evolving changes 
in physician payment reform. Due to the breadth of practice for 
many gynecologic oncologists, coupled with the heterogeneity 
of employment structure, APMs must be designed thoughtfully 
while embedding flexibility and equity. Due to the multitude of 
variables that require careful consideration and the variability in 
stakeholders, the optimal APMs will likely be designed locally.
In November 2015, the SGO submitted a request for informa-
tion regarding the implementation of MIPS and the eligible APMs 
program as authorized under MACRA. The letter addressed 
numerous aspects of the MACRA law, and how the implemen-
tation should be done to positively impact the subspecialty of 
gynecologic oncology and those Medicare patients for whom 
SGO members provide care (46). SGO specifically commented 
on the following challenges to the implementation of MIPS: 
reporting mechanisms for quality performance; data stratifica-
tion; barriers to successful quality performance; data accuracy; 
resource use performance; Clinical Performance Improvement 
Activities (CPIA); development of performance standards; and 
defining and incorporating improvement and public reporting.
“The forthcoming regulations should establish an easy path-
way for PFPM [Physician-Focused Payment Models] proposals 
to be adopted as qualified APMs. CMS should clearly outline 
the criteria that will be used to evaluate PFPM proposals. CMS 
and the [Physician Focused Payment Model Technical Advisory 
Committee] PTAC should work collaboratively with medical 
societies and other organizations developing proposals, provide 
feedback on drafts, and provide data up-front to help in modeling 
impacts. These regulations should also make it clear that PFPMs 
recommended by the PTAC will be accepted by CMS. SGO is 
working very hard on its endometrial cancer APM with the intent 
of having it accepted as a PFPM” (46).
The SGO has endorsed disease site-specific quality indicators 
for ovarian, endometrial, and cervical cancers (47). In December 
2015, CMS selected for consideration nine of the 15 process 
measures specific for gynecologic oncology (48). These quality 
measures were submitted for possible inclusion in the PQRS for 
2017, which will be the first reporting year for MIPS. Should 
SGO’s measures be accepted, they will be published in the CY 
2017 Proposed Medicare Physician Fee Schedule Rule and will 
again be open for comment.
DiSCUSSiON
The payment reforms underway are intended to drive the 
improvement of patient-centered, high-quality, and efficient care 
that is consistent with the Institute of Medicine’s six aims (49). 
The future of payment reform centers on legislation that incen-
tives participation in an APM, while creating an environment 
are included” (8). The oncology ACOs remain in the early phase 
of development, but they are on a path of increasing clinical and 
financial risk (27, 43). To date, there is one global payment pilot 
(29) in which the case-based payment is totally capitated. In this 
innovative model, Maryland and CMS will evaluate an all-payer 
system for hospital payment. Payment will be based on Medicare 
per capita total hospital cost growth. In exchange, Maryland will 
be accountable to generate a pre-determined cost savings while 
achieving quality targets in the domains of readmission, hospital 
acquired conditions, and population health. Oncology services 
would be included in this pilot.
MeDiCARe ONCOLOGY CARe MODeL
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services is developing 
novel payment and care models with the goal of improving the 
effectiveness and efficiency of specialty care. In February 2015, 
CMS’s Center for Medicare and Medicaid Innovation (CMMI) 
introduced a new payment and practice reform model, the 
oncology care model (OCM). The OCM is an innovative model 
for physician practices administering chemotherapy. Under 
the OCM, practices will enter into payment arrangements that 
include financial and performance accountability for episodes 
of care surrounding chemotherapy administration to cancer 
patients.
The goal of the OCM is to utilize appropriately aligned 
financial incentives to improve care coordination, appropriate-
ness of care, and access to care for beneficiaries undergoing 
chemotherapy. The OCM encourages participating practices to 
improve care and lower costs through an episode-based payment 
model that financially incentivizes high-quality, coordinated 
care. Practitioners in an OCM are expected to rely on the most 
current medical evidence and shared decision-making. The OCM 
encourages commercial payers to participate in alignment with 
Medicare to create broader incentives for care transformation at 
the physician practice level. Other payers would also benefit from 
savings, better outcomes for their beneficiaries, and information 
gathered about care quality.
iMPACT ON GYNeCOLOGiC ONCOLOGY
Much is still unknown in terms of the details of the MIPS and 
APMs and the subsequent impact on gynecologic oncology. The 
majority of current efforts to address new payment models focus 
heavily on medical oncology. In medical oncology, examples of 
pilot programs include CMMI’s Oncology Care Model (44) and 
Regional Cancer Care Associates and Horizon BCBS (45). The 
latter pilot focuses on bundled payments for breast cancer patients 
treated with chemotherapy. There are a limited number of APMs 
for surgical oncologic procedures. Mobile Surgery International 
and BCBS of Florida have designed a bundled payment for radical 
prostatectomy for early-stage patients (25). In radiation oncology, 
21st Century Oncology and Humana have developed a bundled 
payment for radiation therapy for 13 prevalent diagnoses, 
including breast, lung, and prostate cancers (26). On January 1, 
2015, MD Anderson partnered with UnitedHealthcare in a pilot 
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where FFS is less tenable. However, a successful transition from 
the current state to an APM assumes that the new paradigm will 
be clearly defined, equitable, and flexible enough to accommo-
date the necessary variation and heterogeneous environments in 
which oncology is practiced today. Medical societies and engaged 
physicians will certainly be critical in creating meaningful, 
actionable, and measurable quality metrics that will be important 
components of MIPS. The SGO has taken critical steps to develop 
and implement a Clinical Outcomes Registry (50). This sub-
specialty-specific registry was designed to be a tool to measure 
quality, compare outcomes, and could function as a platform for 
quality improvement and outcomes research.
Depending on a particular current state, moving into an APM 
will require a variable level of practice and culture transformation. 
For example, although dynamic gynecologic oncology-specific 
pathways have been developed, assessment of compliance is cur-
rently a resource intense process. Technology solutions, such as 
clinical decision support, may improve pathway monitoring but 
must also allow for necessary variation unique to cancer patients. 
Transforming practices into APMs beyond pathways will require 
local solutions that demand insight of the practice environment 
and strategic decisions that must account for many factors. Such 
critical factors include degree of physician integration; scope of 
oncology services provided; scale of health care system; financial 
health of the involved practice(s), hospital(s), and payer(s); 
competitive landscape of local market; and risk tolerance of 
the enterprise(s). Each practice environment will face unique 
challenges to adaptation. For example, smaller single-specialty 
practices may need to vie for scale or develop strategic partner-
ships to optimize care coordination. Larger academic practices 
with research and education components to their mission may be 
stressed as margins tighten. It will be incumbent on gynecologic 
oncologists and academic institutions to structure APMs such 
that gynecologic cancer research and education can be sustain-
able and continue to advance the field into the future.
Gynecologic oncologists function in a very wide array of 
practice settings. Therefore, the design of APMs will require 
flexibility. APMs impose both an administrative burden and 
financial risk that is likely to accelerate the existing trend toward 
practice consolidation. Independent, physician-owned practices 
may lack the resources, scope, and scale required to achieve 
and sustain compliance with the added administrative burdens 
involved in APM participation. Smaller practices are also less 
likely to be able to absorb the potential losses in a model that 
involves downside financial risk. Even gynecologic oncologists 
who are already employed or part of a large physician group will 
be affected. The hospitals or practices that employ gynecologic 
oncologists may further consolidate to achieve scale, which may 
further affect the employed physicians. No doubt, multi-specialty 
oncology practices and hospitals will be developing APMs for a 
wide range of disease sites, which may make cross-comparisons 
of gynecologic cancer APMs difficult between different geo-
graphic regions. The transformation of current models into a 
value-driven framework may require solutions devised at the 
local level. That is, how the new APM is developed and deployed 
may vary widely depending on the specific practice environment 
of a gynecologic oncologist. As these changes unfold, it will be 
critical that gynecologic cancer care remains patient-centered 
and of the highest quality.
The upside to the provision of high-quality, accountable, 
patient-centered care is clear. However, there are increasing 
resource-intensive administrative components to practice which 
must be considered as innovative payment models are designed. 
Some of these requirements divert time and resources away from 
direct patient care. According to a recent commentary (51), “the 
quality-measurement enterprise in U.S. health care is troubled.” 
Some physicians, hospitals, and health plans view measure-
ment as burdensome, expensive, inaccurate, and indifferent to 
the complexity of care delivery. Although P4P programs are 
among the oldest APMs, the success of these models is impeded 
by serious gaps in the current quality measurement system. 
According to a 2014 RAND report (52) that looked at 49 stud-
ies examining the effect of P4P on process and intermediate 
outcome measures, the overall results of the studies were mixed, 
and any identified effects were relatively small. A basic flaw in 
the design of existing P4P models is the reality that meaningful 
oncology-specific patient-centered outcome measures remain 
elusive. Although the pursuit of better value in cancer care is 
a necessary goal, simply establishing timelines is inadequate. 
Even with the repeal of the SGR, there are major challenges 
to achieving value-driven cancer care, including the lack of 
an agreed-upon, patient-centered definition of value; a short-
age of meaningful and actionable performance metrics; and a 
deficiency of accounting systems capable of reflecting the true 
total cost of delivering cancer care.
CONCLUSiON
Substantive payment reform in oncology is timely because there 
is great opportunity to align payments with the triple aim of bet-
ter health and better care at a lower cost. The models described 
represent potential ways to address deficiencies in the current 
system, such as high and variable spending, fragmented and 
uncoordinated care, and insufficient reimbursement for services 
that often make a difference for patients and their families. APMs 
vary in the size, scope, and degree to which they shift away from 
FFS, but they increase provider accountability and support for 
innovative care delivery components.
While unprecedented payment reform activity is taking place in 
oncology, results are limited, and more evidence is needed to fully 
understand the implications of MACRA, MIPS, and APMs. To date, 
there are anecdotal examples of APM pilots around the country, but 
widespread adoption of new APMs by multiple payers is essential 
to build the evidence in support of a model. Although surgical 
oncology and radiation oncology pilots exist, most APMs to date 
have focused predominantly on medical oncology. Cancer care is 
far more interdisciplinary, and the most forward-thinking APMs 
must aim to incorporate the totality of care for the cancer patient. 
Given the range of services provided by gynecologic oncologists, 
payment reform has the potential to disrupt this sub-specialty 
disproportionately. Analysis and reporting of the initial experi-
ences will be important to learn and make iterative improvements. 
While striving for breakthrough innovation, the path forward may 
require some degree of experimentation and tolerance for failure by 
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all parties involved. Preliminary experience indicates that savings 
can be achieved by payment reforms that support increased care 
coordination and the greater use of physician-led care teams. For 
example, such initiatives can reduce hospital readmissions, compli-
cations, and unnecessary imaging. Therefore, a critical priority is to 
develop further evidence of how new payment systems in oncology 
can better align physician reimbursement with care transformations 
to improve care coordination, quality of care, population health, and 
the patient experience. Engagement in payment reform is a unique 
opportunity to positively impact the future state of gynecologic 
oncology. In addition to fiscally responsible high-quality patient 
care, efforts in reform must protect research and education as 
margins tighten. Although much remains unknown, focused atten-
tion of gynecologic oncologists on payment reform is imperative 
to assure that the practice remains patient centered, embodies the 
highest quality, yet transforms into a sustainable and agile sub-
specialty to pro-actively and effectively manage the immense and 
relentless financial pressures and regulatory expectations to come.
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